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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

20 March 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-64 (Part I): SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES,  
THROUGH MID-1953 (Draft for Task Team)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet Bloc political warfare capabilities and military capabilities, through mid-1953.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

1. NIE-25, Probable Soviet Courses of Action to Mid-1952 (2 August 1951) must now be brought up to date. The IAC on 13 March 1952, in adopting in somewhat revised form proposals which had been offered by the Board of National Estimates, authorized two new estimates on Soviet capabilities and probable courses of action:

NIE-64 (Part I), Soviet Capabilities, through Mid-1953.  
Priority: High. Due: 15 May 1952.

NIE-64 (Part II), Probable Soviet Courses of Action, through Mid-1953. Priority: High. Due: 15 June 1952.

NIE-65: Soviet Capabilities, through Mid-1957.  
Priority: Routine. Due: 15 September 1952.

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2. These terms of reference deal only with Part I of NIE-64, Soviet Capabilities, through Mid-1953. This estimate is scheduled for publication in less than two months, and it must be at least at an advanced stage before Part II, Probable Soviet Courses of Action, through Mid-1953 proceeds beyond the preliminary draft stage. As a consequence, this paper cannot be based upon a thorough search for and analysis of all available data. It must, however, be a critical examination of the contributions offered by the agencies, of other papers already published on various aspects of this subject, and of the various published or draft NIE's which are related to this subject. Perhaps the most important single contributory paper now anticipated is the Economic Intelligence Committee study, Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Support a General War, 1 July 1952 - 1 July 1953. One part of this massive EIC paper is now scheduled for publication in April, and the second part in May.

3. These terms of reference are not intended to be complete, though they are designed to raise the most significant questions and to indicate clearly the general kinds of information desired. Under the circumstances and with this kind of estimate, I believe that thorough, critical probing and checking by the members of the task team of all contributions and of all other data available before and while the task team draft estimate is being prepared will be of particular value. This procedure should educate everyone for NIE-65 by increasing our knowledge of the nature and quantity

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of the evidence available, of the most significant gaps, and of the methods by which the contributions are put together by the agencies. It should also enable us to resolve most of the questions of "fact" before the draft estimate reaches the Board.

4. Two of the most basic questions involved in this estimate derive from its title. Most studies of this type are labelled "Soviet Capabilities" or "Soviet War Potential" and deal only with the USSR and only with the military capabilities of the USSR. That seems an unreal approach. The terms of reference for this estimate were drawn up on the assumption that the study cannot be limited to the USSR and must include the entire Bloc. Moreover, they were prepared on the assumption also that the political warfare capabilities as well as the military capabilities must be examined.

5. Throughout these terms of reference, I therefore assume that the Kremlin has complete control of the European Satellites and that the strength and weaknesses of the Satellites must be included with those of the USSR, although the problem of integration and utilization must be studied. NIE-33, Soviet Control of the European Satellites and their Economic and Military Contributions to Soviet Power, through Mid-1953 (7 November 1951) is apparently still solid and reliable so far as Soviet control is concerned. However, the conclusions with regard to the Satellite contributions to Soviet Bloc political, economic, scientific, and military strength will have to be re-examined, since that paper was the first attempt to study that problem and since new data have been collected since that estimate was published.

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6. I assume also, in these terms of reference, that the Kremlin has at least an alliance with Communist China, based on common interests and a common ideology. NIE-58, Sino-Soviet Relations, now in draft, should determine what the current and probable future relationships between the USSR and Communist China are, and will be, so far as can now be decided on the evidence available. However, the issue of Communist China's contribution to the Soviet Bloc's capabilities has not yet been faced squarely and must somehow be met in this estimate.

#### I. SOVIET BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Soviet Bloc political warfare techniques include political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, the actions of Communist Parties and Communist Party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc, support of various kinds of revolutionary movements, and psychological warfare.

##### A. Current Soviet Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities

This section is designed to establish the Soviet Bloc's current political warfare capabilities. This can probably be done most easily by an analysis of Soviet capabilities area by area: Western Europe, the Middle East, etc. It should answer such questions as:

1. What are the time, effort, money, and emphasis placed by the Soviet Bloc upon this effort? In which areas are the Bloc's efforts most strenuous and in which most effective? Which techniques have proved most useful?

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2. How does the amount of time, effort, money, and emphasis placed by the Bloc upon political warfare compare with those placed upon developing military strength?
  3. What skill has been demonstrated in the Bloc political warfare effort? What has been the strategy, and how able has coordination been?
  4. To what degree has Soviet Bloc success in political warfare been due to the Bloc's military power, pressure, and prestige?
  5. Has the effectiveness of Soviet Bloc political warfare been hampered or embarrassed by doctrinal changes, party line switches, or reversals or revisions of Soviet foreign or domestic policy?
  6. What are the defects and vulnerabilities of Bloc political warfare techniques?
  7. How has the effectiveness of Bloc political warfare been affected by the emergence of Communist China?
- B. Probable Soviet Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities, through Mid-1953

This section is designed to determine the Bloc's political warfare capabilities through the period of this estimate. This can probably be done most easily by the area approach. It should try to resolve the basic problem concerning the use and effectiveness of each of the political weapons in each of the areas throughout this period and at the end of the

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period. In this, except where it is otherwise stated, one should assume a continuation of the cold war and of the present policies of each of the major powers. However, any developments which would seriously affect those capabilities should be seriously considered: e.g., the withdrawal of the French from Indo-China or the conclusion of a truce with the Viet Minh, which would in effect mean French withdrawal.

1. What is the Soviet estimate of Western capabilities and intentions and of probable developments in the world situation? How will this affect Bloc use of political warfare?
2. What will be the impact upon Soviet political warfare strategy, tactics, and capabilities of growing Western unity and strength? Of Western division and weakness?
3. What is the likely role of the various political warfare techniques in each of the areas of the world during the period of this estimate?
4. Are there indications of probable revisions of Bloc strategy and tactics in the employment of political warfare weapons?
5. What probable coordination and skill are anticipated in this campaign?
6. What is the over-all outlook for Bloc political warfare capabilities during the period of this estimate, if the cold war continues?
7. What will be the probable effect of Bloc political warfare efforts upon the strength and determination of the West and upon Bloc military strength?

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8. What will be the impact upon Soviet political warfare strategy, tactics, and capabilities of the continuation of the cold war and of the present conflicts in Korea and Indo-China, of extension of the war in the Far East (Burma, e.g.), of limited attacks in the Middle East, of general war without the use of mass destruction weapons, of general war with the use of mass destruction weapons?
9. In each of these instances, what will be the probable effect of Bloc political warfare efforts upon Bloc military capabilities?

## II. POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

This section seeks to determine the current stability of the Soviet regime in the USSR, the extent and strength of Soviet control over the European Satellites, the current relationship between the USSR and Communist China (NIE-58 should resolve this), the stability of the Chinese Communist regime, the factors which might produce change in any of these situations, the probable development of morale throughout the Bloc, and, above all, the effect which the political factors may have upon Bloc military capabilities.

### A. Current Political Situation

1. What is the relationship now existing in the USSR between the Communist Party, the Secret Police, and the military

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forces? Are there any strains within any of these groups or between the groups?

2. What is the present degree of control exercised within the USSR and how is it exercised? How effective has the regime been in winning active support for its domestic and foreign policies?
3. What effect upon Soviet Bloc military capabilities is produced by factors such as the growing gap between the Communist Party leaders and the rank and file of the nation, by the rise in living standards, by the rearmament effort, by the campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" in the Ukraine?
4. What is the character and extent of the Kremlin's control over the European Satellites? To what extent does Soviet control depend upon Soviet police and military force, upon Satellite police and military force? How successful has the Kremlin been in winning active support in the Satellites for its policies?
5. What is the character and extent of Kremlin influence or control over Communist China?
6. What has been the impact of the expansion of Soviet power since World War II upon the international Communist movement? How has this, in turn, affected Soviet Bloc military capabilities?



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7. What is the estimated effect of current political developments within the Bloc upon Bloc military capabilities?

B. Probable Political Developments

1. Is there any evidence or likelihood that the ability of the Soviet regime to maintain control within the USSR will be shaken or threatened? What effect would be produced by a decision such as that to reactivate the agrogorod scheme? What would be the effect of a new decline of the living standards? What other anticipated or probable domestic developments might affect the maintenance of control?
2. Is there any evidence or likelihood that the Kremlin's ability to control the European Satellites will be shaken? Which domestic or international issues are likely to threaten Soviet control? Would the Kremlin be able to maintain control, use the Satellite territories as military bases, and use Satellite forces during general war?
3. What will be the probable character and extent of Kremlin influence and control over Communist China?
4. What will be the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc political structure to political and psychological warfare?
5. What would be the impact upon Soviet Bloc military capabilities of such developments as a complete reversal of

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Soviet policy toward Germany, a clash in Egypt between Egyptian nationalists and the British, Viet Minh control over all of French Indo-China, the collapse of EDF? (NIE-61: Consequences of the Loss of the Indian Subcontinent to Communism in the Period, 1952-1953, upon which work is just now beginning, probably will not be sufficiently advanced to be of assistance.

NIE-35/1: Probable Developments in Indo-China, through Mid-1952 (3 March 1952) should be of considerable aid.)

6. What are the probable effects upon political developments within the Bloc of the continuation of the cold war and of the present conflicts in Korea and Indo-China, of extension of the war in the Far East (Burma, e.g.), of limited attacks in the Middle East, of general war without the use of mass destruction weapons, of general war with the use of mass destruction weapons?
7. In each of these instances, what will be the probable effect of political developments within the Bloc and within the international Communist movement upon Bloc military capabilities?

### III. SCIENTIFIC FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The scientific fields of particular interest include atomic weapons, biological warfare, chemical warfare, antibiotics, elec-

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tronics (ground control interception, airborne interception, radio navigation bombing and gunnery, electronic countermeasure or electromagnetic warfare, and proximity fuses), aircraft, and guided weapons. We want to know which weapons the Kremlin has decided and probably will decide to develop and produce, what are the capabilities of the Soviet Bloc scientific and industrial system for developing and producing new weapons, and what effect this generates upon Soviet Bloc military capabilities. Some of this data can be derived from NIE-60 (Part I): Soviet Air Defense Capabilities, now in draft, and NIE-60 (Part II): Civil Defense in the USSR, also now in draft.

A. Current Soviet Bloc Scientific Capabilities

1. What priority has been and is now assigned to scientific research and development in the Soviet Bloc and which fields are considered the most important? Are there indications of specific programs or objectives?
2. What is the estimated present Soviet Bloc level of research and development in each of the most significant fields?
3. What are the current rates of production in these fields and what is estimated Bloc ability to develop and produce new items and new models?
4. What are the estimated stockpiles of finished weapons in each of these fields?

5. How significant has information acquired from abroad been for Bloc science? Is Soviet Bloc science limited by the general level of the economy, equipment, laboratories, or sources of raw materials?
6. What is the current level of Bloc higher education and technical training for science?
7. To what extent has ideology affected the qualitative work of Bloc science?
8. What is the contribution to the Bloc of Satellite and Chinese facilities? To what extent do Communist China Satellites and the ~~USSR~~ constitute a drain upon the USSR?
9. What is the contribution of Bloc science to Bloc economic and military capabilities?

B. Probable Soviet Bloc Scientific Capabilities

This section is designed to determine the Soviet Bloc capabilities in research and development upon scientific weapons and the effect which those capabilities will have upon Soviet military capabilities, through the period of this estimate. For each of the fields and for Soviet science in general, this section should attempt to resolve questions such as:

1. What are the capabilities of Soviet Bloc scientists in the various fields to progress in their research and development of new weapons? How are these capabilities

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affected by Soviet Bloc capital investment programs, educational programs, physical facilities, the organization and direction of Bloc science, etc.?

2. Are any new or considerably improved weapons likely to appear in 1952-1953 due to research and development programs begun earlier?
3. Are the capabilities of the Soviet economy to allocate materials for research and for the production of new weapons likely to be a limiting factor?
4. What will be the capabilities of the Satellites and of Communist China to contribute to Bloc scientific capabilities? To what degree will they constitute a drain upon the USSR?
5. How concentrated and vulnerable to attack are Bloc research and development facilities and the installations manufacturing scientific weapons?
6. What is the probable effect of Bloc scientific capabilities upon Bloc strategy and tactics?
7. In the various kinds of war listed earlier, what will be the probable effect of Bloc scientific capabilities upon Bloc economic and military capabilities?

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#### IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The EIC study of Soviet economic capabilities should resolve most of the issues important here, and our task may be limited largely to checking data and ascertaining what the impact of the economic capabilities is and will be upon military capabilities. Our principal interests here are in the following:

1. Current production of the key materials, products and weapons.
2. Current resource allocation of national income.
3. Bloc ability to increase production of military items.
4. Bloc ability to expand industrial and agricultural production.
5. Operational stocks and stockpiles of critical materials, equipment, and weapons.
6. Pattern of trade as it affects the Bloc economy and military potential.
7. Contribution to Bloc strength made by economies of the Satellites and of Communist China. Ability of Bloc to integrate its economies.
8. Status and probable effect of Soviet dispersal of industry program. (NIE-60; Part III): Soviet Program to Disperse Industry and Stockpile, the contributions for which are now due, should help here.)

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9. Significance of foreign capital equipment, technical knowledge, and materials for maintaining and developing the current Bloc program. (NIE-22: Vulnerability of Soviet Bloc to Economic Warfare (19 February 1951) should assist here, as should the EIC paper now in progress on East-West trade.)
10. Ability of the Bloc economy to produce new weapons developed by Bloc scientists, while at same time performing other critical functions.
11. Indications that the long-term investment programs designed to increase the productive capacity of the USSR, the Satellites, and Communist China has been, or will be, seriously altered to achieve greater immediate war-readiness.
12. In the various kinds of war listed earlier, what will be the ability of the Bloc economy to maintain and increase military production, and what will be the probable effect of Bloc economic capabilities upon Bloc military capabilities?

V. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES

Several published estimates should be of some aid here:

SE-10: Soviet Capabilities for a Surprise Attack on the Continental United States Before July 1952 (15 Sept 1951)

- SE-14: Soviet Capabilities for a Military Attack on the United States Before July 1952 (23 Oct 1951)
- SE-16: The Strength and Capabilities of Soviet Bloc Forces to Conduct Military Operations Against NATO (12 Oct 1951)
- NIE-18: Probability of Soviet Employment of BW and CW in Event of Attacks Upon the US (10 Jan 1951)
- NIE-31: Soviet Capabilities for Clandestine Attack Against the US with Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Vulnerability of the US to Such Attack (4 Sept 1951)

A. Current Military Strength

1. Present strength -- size, composition, equipment, mobility, training, morale, combat efficiency, disposition, and coordination -- of the Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese Communist military forces and of those forces coordinated.
2. Size and quality of present holdings of military equipment by Soviet Bloc military forces, estimated size and quality of military stockpiles, military consumption rates of Soviet forces under cold and hot war conditions.
3. Control, direction, and integration of the forces of the Bloc -- ground forces, airborne forces, navy and merchant fleets, and air forces (tactical, long range, air defense, naval, airborne, and civil).
4. Bloc strategic and tactical doctrine.



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B. Current Bloc Capabilities

1. Capacity of Bloc forces to initiate and maintain various kinds of military campaigns: present conflicts in Korea and Indo-China, extension of war by proxy in Far East, limited attacks in Middle East, general war without use of mass destruction weapons, general war with use of mass destruction weapons.
2. Capacity of Bloc to defend itself against air attack, including atomic attack, and to carry attack to UK and US. (Bloc atomic inventory, number and range of Bloc aircraft capable of delivering atomic bombs, probable Bloc target priorities, operational readiness of Bloc long-range aircraft.)
3. Capacity of Bloc forces to hold and utilize territories added to Bloc or overrun by Bloc forces in early stages of any war.

C. Probable Bloc Military Strength

D. Probable Bloc Military Capabilities

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